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245 
CONTROLLING THE PROSECUTION OF BRIBERY: 
APPLYING CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLES TO DEFINE 
A “FOREIGN OFFICIAL” IN THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 
Kayla Feld 
Abstract: This Comment focuses on the debate surrounding the definition of an 
“instrumentality” within the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act’s (FCPA) “foreign official” 
provision. The FCPA prohibits bribery of “foreign officials” but provides little guidance as to 
the types of entities included within the meaning of an “instrumentality.” The Department of 
Justice construes this term broadly and therefore can aggressively prosecute alleged 
corruption. This Comment argues that courts should provide guidance on the definition of a 
“foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA by applying principles of control drawn 
from corporate law. Such guidance would accomplish three important tasks. First, it would 
help corporations comply with the FCPA. Second, it would align with the approach used by 
foreign jurisdictions designated in treaty obligations. Finally, it could help achieve 
Congress’s original objectives in enacting the legislation: namely, to prevent corruption of 
foreign public officials as well as the negative consequences for foreign policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, federal investigations 
uncovered illicit practices in both government and private business, 
including unreported campaign contributions and “questionable” and 
“illegal”1 payments to domestic and foreign political officials.2 The 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) began investigating these 
payments and discovered that approximately 400 U.S. corporations had 
made over $300 million in bribes to foreign public officials in order to 
secure business.3 In 1977, Congress responded by enacting the Foreign 
                                                     
1. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH  CONG., REPORT OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES A-1 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 353 
(May 19, 1976) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES]. 
2. See id.; see also John Castellano, Current Issues in Cases Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5669 (May 25, 2011); Amy D. Westbrook, Enthusiastic 
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 
GA. L. REV. 489, 499 (2011). 
3. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–6 (1977); see also REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND 
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 1, at A–C; Thomas McSorley, 
Article: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 750 (2011); Theodore C. 
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Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)4 to criminalize bribery and improve the 
U.S. corporate image abroad.5 Congress noted the “severe foreign policy 
problems” these bribes created for the U.S., and intended for the FCPA 
to prevent U.S. businesses from engaging in bribery, as this would have 
negative implications for the image of the United States abroad.6 
Congress sought to restore public confidence in American corporate 
practice.7 The primary evil that Congress sought to address with the 
FCPA was improper payments to foreign government officials, which 
“invariably tend[] to embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem 
for the United States among citizens of foreign nations, and lend 
credence to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United 
States that American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the 
political processes of their nations.”8 
The FCPA had a slow start.9 During the first quarter century of the 
FCPA’s existence, the SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ), jointly 
                                                     
Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 719, 719 
(1976). 
4. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 
(2006)). 
5. See McSorley, supra note 3, at 750 (discussing the factors contributing to the creation of the 
FCPA); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 499; Castellano, supra note 2. 
6. See Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before 
the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th 
Cong. 5 (1977) (statement of Rep. Bob Eckhardt, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin., 
H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce) (stating that “[b]ribery of foreign officials by U.S. 
corporations . . . creates severe foreign policy problems”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, 4–5 (1977); S. 
REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (noting “severe adverse effects” of bribery); REPORT OF THE SEC ON 
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 61; 
Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Counts 
One Through Ten of the Indictment at 140, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS 
(C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 21, 2011), ECF No. 305 [hereinafter Koehler Declaration]; see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY 
PROVISIONS 2 (June 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-
persons-guide.pdf [hereinafter FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS]. 
7. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th 
Cong. 4–5 (1977) (statement of Rep. Bob Eckhardt, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & 
Fin., H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (noting that bribery 
“erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market system”); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 124. 
8. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5. 
9. See S. REP NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (explaining the enforcement duties of the DOJ and SEC); 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining the 
respective roles of the DOJ and SEC); Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay: A 
Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 
47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 159 (2010). 
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responsible for enforcing the FCPA,10 initiated only two or three cases 
per year.11 Fines tended to remain below $1,000,000.12 However, after 
an initial twenty years of relative dormancy, enforcement surged.13 Over 
the past ten years, the DOJ and SEC have greatly increased the number 
of enforcement actions and the severity of fines assessed.14 In 2010, for 
example, the DOJ and the SEC initiated a record of forty-eight and 
twenty-six cases respectively.15 This trend shows no sign of abating, and 
the DOJ recently confirmed its intent to “vigorously enforce” the 
FCPA.16 In November 2009, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
remarked that the “past year was probably the most dynamic single year 
in the more than 30 years since the FCPA was enacted” and promised to 
continue “the upward trend in FCPA enforcement.”17 
While DOJ officials commend the surge in investigations and 
prosecutions, the reaction in the corporate world has been less 
enthusiastic. Of particular concern to directors and officers of 
corporations doing business abroad is the rise of prosecution of 
individuals.18 According to Mark Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the 
                                                     
10. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 2. 
11. 4 ARKIN, BUSINESS CRIME § 18 (Matthew Bender 2011); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 497; 
Roger M. Witten et al., The Increased Prosecution of Individuals Under the FCPA: Trends and 
Implications, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REP.: RISK AND COMPLIANCE, no. 12, 2009, at 10. 
12. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 495. 
13. See 4 ARKIN, supra note 11, at § 18; Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 90 (2010); Mike Koehler, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 
389, 389 (2010) (noting “FCPA enforcement was largely non-existent for most of its history”); 
Dionne Searcey, U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124329477230952689.html; FCPA Digest of Cases and Review 
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, i–xi (Oct. 1, 2009), 
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/fcpa_digest.pdf (listing FCPA enforcement actions 
chronologically). 
14. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 495–96, 522 (noting “recent years have seen an ‘extraordinary 
upswing’ in the number of FCPA actions brought by the DOJ and SEC”). 
15. See 4 ARKIN, supra note 11, at § 18; 2011 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & 
CRUTCHER LLP, 2 (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. 
16. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial Global 
Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (Nov. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/131641.htm. 
17. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-
testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf. 
18. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 15, at 2–4 (discussing FCPA enforcement 
actions against individual defendants in 2011). 
14 - Feld Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  7:01 PM 
248 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:245 
 
Fraud Division at the DOJ, the rise in individual prosecutions is “not an 
accident.”19 Rather, the trend reflects the Department’s policy of 
deterring bribery by holding individuals personally accountable.20 The 
sanctions resulting from these enforcement actions have also risen 
dramatically. In 1994, the largest FCPA-related sanction was $24.8 
million.21 In 2008, a settlement for $800 million by Seimens 
Aktiengesellschaft (“Seimens AG”) and its subsidiaries dwarfed the 
previous record.22 The increase in prosecutions and sanctions reflects a 
trend of increasingly aggressive DOJ enforcement policy.23 The FCPA’s 
vague language has facilitated the Government’s increasingly vigorous 
approach by permitting a broad interpretation of the statute’s 
provisions.24 
This Comment surveys the debate surrounding the clarity of the term 
“instrumentality” within the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” and 
recommends a resolution. The FCPA prohibits bribery of “foreign 
officials,” defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign government 
or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,”25 but provides 
little guidance as to the types of entities included within the meaning of 
an “instrumentality.”26 The DOJ construes this term broadly, which 
permits it to aggressively prosecute alleged corruption.27 Corporations 
                                                     
19. Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORP. CRIME REP. 
36(1) (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohn091608.htm. 
20. See id.; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Bar Association 
National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/2010/02-25-10aag-
AmericanBarAssosiation.pdf (“[T]he prospect of significant prison sentences . . . should make clear 
to every corporate executive . . . that we will seek to hold you personally accountable for FCPA 
violations.”). 
21. See United States v. Lockheed Corp., No. CR.A. 194CR226MHS, 1995 WL 17064259, at *7 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1995); Bixby, supra note 13, at 128. 
22. See Plea Agreement at 10–11, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 
(S.D. Tex. filed Feb. 11, 2009), ECF No. 12; SEC v. Halliburton Co., No. 4:09-CV-399, at 5 (S.D. 
Tex. 2009); see also Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 9, at 161; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc. 
with Related Accounting Violations – Companies to Pay Disgorgement of $177 Million; KBR 
Subsidiary to Pay Criminal Fines of $402 Million; Total Payments to be $579 Million, Litigation 
Release No. 20897A, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2935A (Feb. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm. 
23.  See Bixby, supra note 13, at 90–91; 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & 
CRUTCHER LLP, 4 (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-
EndFCPAUpdate.aspx. 
24. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 503. 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
26. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
27. See, e.g., Response of the United States to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 4, 
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have not been motivated to challenge the Government’s interpretation in 
court, and have tended to opt for settlement rather than proceed to trial.28 
In 2011 alone, six settlements, plea agreements, or deferred prosecutions 
involved disputes over the definition of “instrumentality.”29 While 
corporations may have preferred to resolve these cases without a 
possibly lengthy trial and the ensuing publicity, each case diverted from 
trial has deprived the courts of a chance to clarify crucial definitions.30 
On the other hand, individuals prosecuted for bribery under the FCPA 
typically proceed to trial in an attempt to avoid high fines coupled with 
jail sentences.31 For this reason, the individuals who have litigated FCPA 
cases have played a crucial role in developing the sparse jurisprudence. 
The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions (“Working Group”), which monitors the implementation 
and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, has also 
commented on the lack of explicit language in the definition of a 
“foreign official.”32 In its most recent evaluation, the Working Group 
noted that some courts had addressed the definition, and it noted more 
“positive legal developments.”33 The Working Group noted that District 
Court opinions are not binding on higher courts and thus the 
interpretation they provide remains subject to further dispute.34 Even the 
                                                     
United States v. O’Shea, No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 50 (arguing that 
Congress intended for the FCPA to have a broad interpretation because of the use of the word “any” 
in the foreign official provision). 
28. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 2, at 497; Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a 
Foreign Official Anyway? 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1248 (2008); Stephen G. Huggard & Haley 
Morrison, Some FCPA Concepts are Coming into Focus: Implications for the UK Bribery Act, 
MARTINDALE-HUBBEL, July 5, 2011, available at 
http://www.edwardswildman.com/files/upload/comlitjune11_usfocusbriberyact.html. 
29. See infra Part III.C. 
30. See FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, 18 (Jan. 2012), http://www.shearman.com/files/ 
Publication/bb1a7bff-ad52-4cf9-88b9-
9d99e001dd5f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6ec0766a-25aa-41ec-8731-
041a672267a6/FCPA-Digest-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan2012.pdf. 
31. See Bixby, supra note 13, at 111–12. 
32. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES: PHASE 3: REPORT ON 
THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 26 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf 
[hereinafter 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3]. 
33. See id. at 27. Because of the timing of the report, the Working Group mentioned only United 
States v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, 2:08-CR-522-TJS (E.D. Pa., Sept. 4, 2008), which did not produce a 
written opinion. 
34. 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3, supra note 32, at 27. 
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more recent court opinions that provide written opinions35 (which were 
not available at the time the Working Group prepared its report) provide 
little clarity, as they merely confirm that “[s]tate-owned business 
enterprises may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered 
instrumentalities of a foreign government and their officers and 
employees to be foreign officials.”36 This language does little to check 
the DOJ’s broad interpretation of “foreign official,” permitting it to 
continue its pattern of aggressive enforcement without providing useful 
guidance to businesses.37 For this reason, the OECD’s Working Group 
has urged more “positive legal developments concerning the application 
of the definition of ‘foreign official’ in the FCPA to . . . employees of 
state-owned or controlled enterprises.”38 
Several individuals have already challenged the DOJ’s interpretation 
of the “foreign official” definition.39 However, a troublesome lack of 
clarity remains. In the meantime, many corporations, fearing sanctions 
because of what they perceive as excessive vagueness in the law, have 
been forced to adopt the hyper-conservative strategy of labeling any 
company with a greater than one percent government ownership as “high 
risk.”40 This tactic significantly limits the types of businesses U.S. 
corporations may work with, reducing their ability to compete with 
corporations from other countries that are not similarly restrained.41  
This Comment argues that courts should either clarify the definition 
of a “foreign official” or supply guidelines that will clarify standards for 
prosecuting FCPA violations. International treaties and anti-corruption 
laws in foreign countries could assist in formulating guidelines to clarify 
the definition of a foreign official.42 If courts interpret the meaning of a 
                                                     
35. See, e.g., Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the 
Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 
18, 2011). 
36. UNITED STATES, U.S. RESPONSE TO OECD PHASE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE (Oct. 30, 1998), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response1.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 
RESPONSE TO OECD PHASE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE] (emphasis added). 
37. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1250. 
38. 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3, supra note 32, at 27.  
39. See Witten et al., supra note 11, at 10 (noting “unlike companies, individuals are more likely 
not to settle and to go to trial”). 
40. See, e.g., Ryan Morgan, ‘Majority’ Report, THE FCPA BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011, 7:18 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/15/majority-report.html. 
41. See McSorley, supra note 3, at 750; Jacqueline C. Wolff & Nirav S. Shah, Is Anyone Not a 
Foreign Official Under the FCPA?, 18 BUS. CRIMES BULL. (Law Journal Newsletters), Feb. 2011, 
at 6, available at http://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/Articles_By_Us/ 
Foreign%20Bribery(3).pdf. 
42. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
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“foreign official,” they could refine the definition using principles of 
corporate law to evaluate a business entity’s connection to the 
government by the level of control exerted on it by the government. In 
doing so, courts would help corporations comply with the FCPA by 
using legal principles familiar to them. Ideally, this path would result in 
increased clarity and better compliance. 
Part I of this Comment introduces the basic provisions of the FCPA, 
including relevant amendments. Part II describes the legislative history 
of the FCPA. Part III examines the case law dealing with the definition 
of a “foreign official.” Part IV discusses approaches to defining 
corporate responsibility from international anti-bribery legislation. 
Finally, Part V argues that courts should apply principles of control 
drawn from U.S. corporate law when defining a “foreign official” for 
purposes of the FCPA. This approach should remain consistent with 
those used by foreign jurisdictions to comply with treaty obligations. 
I.  THE FCPA WAS DESIGNED TO INCREASE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PREVENT CORRUPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
The FCPA contains two types of provisions: (1) accounting and 
internal control provisions; and (2) anti-bribery provisions.43 The former 
require companies with securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges to 
maintain records that “accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and 
dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”44 These provisions also require 
the companies to maintain a system of internal controls that provides 
reasonable assurances that transactions are recorded and executed with 
the general or specific authorization of the management.45 The following 
sections describe the anti-bribery provisions in greater detail. 
A.  The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA Outline Prohibited 
Corrupt Acts 
Any company with securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges is subject 
to the FCPA.46 The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions provide in relevant 
part: 
                                                     
Transactions, art. 1, Nov. 21, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter OECD 
Convention]. 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
44. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
45. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
46. Id. § 78dd-1(a). 
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(a) Prohibition 
It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities 
registered [with the SEC], or for any officer, director, employee, 
or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on 
behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance 
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or 
authorization of the giving of anything of value to— 
(1) any foreign official for purposes of— 
  (A) 
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in 
his official capacity, 
(ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act 
in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or 
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or 
 (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a 
foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or 
influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining 
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, 
any person.47 
The FCPA applies to United States companies and their personnel, 
foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and 
United States citizens or any person while in the United States 
territory.48 The FCPA prohibits anyone to whom it applies from paying, 
offering, promising, or authorizing payment or anything of value to a 
foreign official to obtain or retain business.49 The anti-bribery provisions 
can be divided into three elements: (1) “anything of value” given for the 
purposes of (2) “obtaining or retaining business” to a (3) “foreign 
official.”50 
The FCPA does not define the first element, “anything of value,” and 
does not provide a de minimus exception.51 FCPA enforcement actions 
have shown that a variety of things may fit the definition.52 For example, 
                                                     
47. Id. § 78dd-1(a); see also § 78c(a)(8) (defining an “issuer” as “any person who issues or 
proposes to issue any security”). 
48. Id. § 78dd-1(a); see also Koehler, supra note 13, at 389. 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1). 
50. See Koehler, supra note 13, at 389–90. 
51. Id. at 390. 
52. Id. 
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one enforcement action penalized an American company for providing 
Nigerian foreign officials with vehicles filled with cash and left in hotel 
parking lots,53 while in another instance a company’s less tangible 
payment of “executive training programs at U.S. universities” for 
Chinese officials was considered among the items of value.54 
The second element of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions is the use of 
the item of value for obtaining or retaining business.55 A Fifth Circuit 
decision interpreted this element broadly, holding that the legislative 
history of the FCPA shows Congress intended to prohibit a range of 
payments beyond simply acquiring or retaining contracts.56 In United 
States v. Kay,57 the defendants, members of a Houston-based corporation 
that exported grain, were accused of making payments to Haitian 
government officials.58 The issue was whether these payments, allegedly 
made for the purpose of reducing the corporation’s customs duties and 
taxes, was sufficient to constitute an offense under the FCPA.59 The 
court determined that such payments can provide an unfair advantage to 
the payer, thus functioning to “obtain or retain business.”60 The court 
emphasized that such payments do not automatically violate the FCPA, 
only those “intended to produce an effect” that would “assist in 
obtaining or retaining business.”61 The court held that Congress had 
intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist 
the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining 
business.62 Since Kay, several other enforcement actions have involved 
                                                     
53. See Information at 17–18, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. 
Tex. filed Feb. 6, 2009), ECF No. 1. 
54. Complaint at 16, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., Case No. CV 09-6094 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 31, 
2009). UTStarcom, the subject of this enforcement action, had also provided foreign government 
officials or their families with work visas to work at UTStarcom facilities without requesting they 
actually work, paid for trips to popular destinations in the United States to visit company facilities, 
despite the fact that no facilities existed in these areas, and spent approximately seven million 
dollars worth of gifts in conjunction with the executive training courses. See Press Release, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges California Telecom Company with Bribery and Other FCPA 
Violations, Litigation Release No. 21357, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3093 
(Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21357.htm; Koehler, 
supra note 13, at 390–91. 
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(B), 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), 78dd-3(a)(1)(B). 
56. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Koehler, supra note 13, at 393.  
57. 359 F.3d 738. 
58. Id. at 740. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 754–55. 
61. Id. at 756. 
62. Id. 
14 - Feld Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  7:01 PM 
254 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:245 
 
allegedly improper payments that assisted the payor in doing business in 
a foreign country.63 These include payments for customs duties, taxes, 
licenses, permits, and certifications.64 
The third element involves the person to whom the payment or gift is 
given. The FCPA defines “foreign official” as: 
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public 
international organization, or any person acting in an official 
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, 
agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public 
international organization.65  
The FCPA does not define “instrumentality.” Scholars have noted the 
lack of a clear definition and the susceptibility of instrumentality to 
multiple interpretations lead to significant confusion among corporations 
and litigants in FCPA actions.66 
The anti-bribery provisions were created with one limited exception.67 
Commonly referred to as the “grease payments” exception,68 this 
provision permits the use of “facilitating or expediting payment . . . to 
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action 
by a foreign official, political party, or party official.”69 Routine 
governmental action is defined as “only an action which is ordinarily 
and commonly performed by a foreign official [and] does not include 
any decision . . . to award new business or continue business with a 
                                                     
63. Koehler, supra note 13, at 394 n.35; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
SEC Charges Eli Lilly and Company with FCPA Violations, Release 2012-273 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-273.htm (involving allegations of improper 
payments by subsidiaries to foreign government officials to win business in Russia, Brazil, China, 
and Poland); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Johnson & Johnson with 
Foreign Bribery, Release 2011-87 (Apr. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-87.htm (involving allegations of bribing public doctors 
in several European countries and paying kickbacks to Iraq to obtain business). 
64. Koehler, supra note 13, at 394. 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
66. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1248. 
67. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting “routine governmental 
action” refers to “very narrow categories of largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities 
performed by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries”); Timothy O’Toole & Andrew T. Wise, You 
Mean You’re Really Going to Try an FCPA Case? A Checklist of Defenses for Practitioners 
Handling Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Cases, THE CHAMPION, Sept. 2011, at n.6, available at 
http://nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=21931&terms=a+checklist+of+fcpa+defenses (noting that 
counsel advising companies on FCPA compliance advise against relying on this exception). 
68. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 2, at 505–06 (explaining the types of action permitted by the 
grease payments exception); McSorley, supra note 3, at 764. 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b). 
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particular party.”70 Despite their somewhat unsavory-sounding name, 
“grease payments,” because of their routine nature, are not viewed as 
bribery and are therefore lawful under the FCPA.71 
Congress has amended the FCPA twice.72 In 1988, Congress added 
two affirmative defenses and refined the knowledge requirement73 for an 
FCPA violation.74 The first defense to enforcement is that “the 
payment . . . was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the 
foreign official’s . . . country.”75 This defense is limited because no 
country has a law expressly permitting bribery.76 The second defense is 
for “promotional expenses,” and permits a payment to a foreign official 
if it was a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and 
lodging expenses” and was directly related to the “promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of products or services.”77 The crucial 
element of this defense is the reasonableness of the expenditure.78 
                                                     
70. See id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)−(B). 
   71. See id. § 78dd-1(b). 
72. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); see 
also Westbrook, supra note 2, at 502. For House and Senate Reports relevant to the FCPA’s 1988 
and 1998 Amendments, see Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Legislative History, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
73. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1121 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1901) (stating that 
“knowledge is established by if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such 
circumstance, unless the person actually believes the circumstance does not exist”); see also United 
States v. Bourke, No.  
09-4704-cr (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) (defendant liable where he consciously avoided knowing an 
intermediary was paying bribes); United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374–78 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (holding “knowledge of the object of the conspiracy,” sufficient to satisfy the knowledge 
requirement); United States v. Self, No. SA CR 08-110-AG (C.D. Cal. 2008) (defendant liable when 
he was “aware of the high probability that the payments” were improper, but “deliberately avoided 
learning the true facts”). 
74. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); see also Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, 
at 127–41. 
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1). 
76. See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting the defendant’s 
contention that under local law he was relieved of criminal liability because he voluntarily reported 
the bribe); ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME PRACTITIONERS 16 (2d ed. 2012). 
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
78. See O’Toole & Wise, supra note 67 (noting “[t]he more the trip looks like a routine business 
trip . . . the more viable the defense becomes”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lucent 
Technologies Inc. Agrees to Pay $1 Million Fine to Resolve FCPA Allegations (Dec. 21, 2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_1028.html (stating that 
defendants were liable for taking Chinese government officials on sightseeing trips to Disneyland, 
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Congress amended the FCPA again in 199879 to ensure that it 
complied with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD 
Convention”).80 The United States’ interest in the OECD Convention 
arose from concerns that the passage of the FCPA had put U.S. 
businesses at a competitive disadvantage with foreign companies 
unconstrained by comparable anti-bribery laws.81 The purpose of the 
OECD Convention was to “level the playing field for business 
worldwide,”82 and it required signatories to create or modify anti-
corruption legislation to comply with its requirements.83 The 1998 
modifications to the FCPA extended the statute’s jurisdiction to conduct 
occurring outside the United States.84 It also broadened the scope of 
liability by including in the definition of “foreign official” foreign 
nationals working for U.S. companies and officers of any public 
international organization.85 Aside from the 1988 and 1998 
Amendments, the structure of the FCPA has remained unchanged. 
II.  THE FCPA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REVEALS THAT 
CONGRESS DISAGREED OVER THE BEST METHOD TO 
PROHIBIT CORRUPTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
The legislative history has been read to provide support for both the 
DOJ and SEC’s broad construction of the term “instrumentality,” as well 
as the considerably narrower interpretation proposed by the corporations 
subject to FCPA enforcement actions. The DOJ and SEC have argued 
                                                     
Universal Studios, and various cities). 
79. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 
1107, 1416–17 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff). 
80. See OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1; Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 26, 
390–436 (discussing the portions of the FCPA’s legislative history relevant to the adoption of the 
1998 amendments). 
81. See Wolff & Shah, supra note 41, at 6; McSorley, supra note 3, at 750. 
82. H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 12. 
83. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at 7. 
84. See, e.g., Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of 
the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, United States v. 
Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 21, 2011), ECF No. 304 [hereinafter 
Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss]. 
85. See The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1416–17 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff). 
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that Congress intended “instrumentalities” as a catchall term for entities 
not covered by “agencies” or “departments.”86 Not surprisingly, 
corporations subject to FCPA enforcement actions argue for a much 
more narrow construction.87 
This section summarizes the FCPA’s legislative history by 
introducing the various congressional hearings, resolutions, and 
proposed bills that ultimately led to its enactment.88 Congress became 
concerned about the results of investigations made by the Watergate 
Special Prosecutions Office of “illegal, and therefore undisclosed, 
corporate campaign contributions in the 1972 elections.”89 These 
contributions, as well as several instances involving “questionable” and 
“illegal”90 payments made by United States companies to foreign 
government officials or political parties,91 prompted the United States 
Senate and House of Representatives to hold a series of hearings 
concerning instances of corrupt payments.92 
Between May 16, 1975, and September 12, 1975, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations met on several different 
occasions to discuss prominent instances of corruption.93 During the first 
of these hearings, Senator Frank Church, the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee, explained that the hearings were concerned with the 
foreign policy consequences of illegal political payments made by 
United States companies.94 A series of hearings held in the House and 
Senate in 1975 led to proposals for legislation to deter corporations from 
making corrupt payments.95 
In May 1976, the SEC published a report on Questionable and Illegal 
Corporate Payments which gave new momentum to the discussion on 
                                                     
86. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1250, 1273. 
87. See id. 
88. For a significantly more extensive explanation of the legislative history, see Koehler 
Declaration, supra note 6, at 10–143. 
89. See REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND 
PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
90. See id. at 1. 
91. See id. at 5. 
92. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 at 6–7 (indicating the various bills considered over the course 
of several hearings). 
93. See George H. Mazzarantani, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 855, 
855–56 (1988); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 
930, 930–31 n.1 (2012). 
94. See Koehler, supra note 93, at 933. 
95. See id. 
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specifically criminalizing illegal payments.96 The report discussed 
foreign and domestic payments with a focus on whether these payments 
should have been disclosed to investors.97 Following the publication of 
the report, there was a hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs titled “Corrupt Payments By U.S. Business 
Enterprises” to discuss Senate Bills 3133, 3379, and 3418.98 President 
Ford supported these efforts by establishing a Task Force on 
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad,99 issuing remarks introducing 
new initiatives of the task force, and urging enactment of proposed 
legislation to require the disclosure of payments to foreign officials.100 
Despite several additional bills circulating through the House and 
Senate, nothing was enacted. The final hearings of President Ford’s 
term, held in September of 1976, discussed four bills. However, due to 
“end of session pressures,” no bill passed before Congress adjourned in 
October 1976.101 
Once Congress reconvened, several bills began circulating that 
eventually led to the FCPA. On January 18, 1977, Senator Proxmire 
introduced Senate Bill 305.102 This bill prohibited bribery of any official 
of a “foreign government or instrumentality thereof.”103 It did not define 
either of these terms. Senate Bill 305 was ultimately merged with 
another bill, House Bill 3815,104 to become the FCPA. House Bill 3815 
defined a foreign official as “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or 
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such 
government or department, agency, or instrumentality.”105 The report 
accompanying House Bill 3815 explains that the prohibited transactions 
are those that are  “corruptly intended to induce the recipient to use his 
or her influence to affect any act or decision of a foreign official, foreign 
government or an instrumentality of the foreign government . . . [the 
                                                     
96. REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND 
PRACTICES, supra note 1. 
97. Id. at 55. 
98. S. REP. NO. 94-1031, at 1 (1976). 
99. See H.R. DOC. NO. 94-572, at 1 (1976) (Foreign Payments Disclosure: Message from the 
President of the United States Urging Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Require the Disclosure 
of Payments to Foreign Officials). 
100. H.R. DOC. NO. 94-572. 
101. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 7. 
102. S. 305, 95th Cong. (1977). 
103. Id. at 161. 
104. H.R. 3815, 95th Cong. (1977). 
105. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977). 
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payment] must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official 
position.”106  In early December of 1977, the Speaker of the House and 
the Secretary of the Senate signed the amended Senate Bill 305.107 
President Carter signed Senate Bill 305 on December 19, 1977.108 Senate 
Bill 305 did not define an “instrumentality.” 
III.  COURTS HAVE CONSIDERED THE “FOREIGN OFFICIAL” 
PROVISION, BUT CASE LAW REMAINS IN ITS INFANCY 
Courts have had few opportunities to address the ambiguities in the 
FCPA, and the DOJ’s broad interpretation of “foreign official” has 
largely avoided judicial scrutiny for over a quarter century.109 This has 
resulted from the tendency of companies prosecuted for violating the 
FCPA to resort to extrajudicial settlements, such as non-prosecution and 
plea agreements, rather than contesting the charges.110 To this point, the 
only judicial responses have been scattered district court opinions 
denying defendants’ motions to dismiss.111 In each of these actions, the 
defendants have made essentially the same claim: the FCPA does not 
apply to the conduct charged because, as a matter of law, the officers 
and employees of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) are not “foreign 
officials” as the term “instrumentality” does not encompass SOEs.112 
The courts’ responses have been generally unvaried, stating that the 
determination of whether “instrumentality” encompasses an entity 
requires a fact-intensive analysis that is inappropriate for a motion to 
dismiss.113 The initial court decisions provided no discussion of the 
merits.114 More recent orders, however, have produced frameworks for 
analyzing whether an entity could be considered an instrumentality 
                                                     
106. Id. at 7–8. 
107. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to dd-2 (2006)). 
108. Id. 
109. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1245–46. 
110. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
111. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Order Denying 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment, United States v. Carson, 
No. 09-cr-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011). 
112. See, e.g., Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 27. 
113. See, e.g., In Chambers Criminal Minutes at 9, United States v. Lindsey, No. CR10-01031-
AHM (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011) (denying defendant Lindsey’s motion to dismiss); Order Denying 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 5, Carson, 2011 WL 
5101701. 
114. See Order at 1, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009). 
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within the meaning of the FCPA’s “foreign official.”115 Even with this 
progression towards clarity, these district court opinions generate no 
binding precedent. 
A.  Although Early FCPA Decisions Indicated Who Could Be a 
“Foreign Official,” the Courts Failed to Create a Workable 
Framework 
An SOE is a legal entity created by the government to partake in 
commercial activities on the government’s behalf.116 An SOE may be 
either partially- or fully-owned by the state.117 A significant proportion 
of FCPA defendants are prosecuted for conduct involving SOEs, 
therefore resolving the question will impact many FCPA defendants.118 
The first cases119 to address whether an SOE could be an 
“instrumentality” within the FCPA’s definition of a “foreign official” 
did little to resolve the ambiguities.120 In United States v. Nguyen,121 the 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the payments 
made to SOEs in Vietnam did not violate the FCPA, because these types 
of entities did not qualify as “instrumentalities” of the government.122 
The court rejected their motion in a one-sentence order.123 In a 
                                                     
115.  See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment, 
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701; see also United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
116. See, e.g., Definition of “State-Owned Enterprise (SOE),” INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/soe.asp#axzz22sSPLRwH (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).  
117. Id. For example, most businesses listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange are SOEs and have 
strong links to the government. See Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Its 
Application to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13 (2008); STOYAN TENEV 
ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 83–84 (2002), available at 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/93111800485831c58971e9fc046daa89/Corporate+Governan
ce+in+China.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
118. See Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at 411–13 (discussing that over two-thirds of the 
FCPA prosecutions in 2009 related to SOEs). 
119. See Michael Volkov, Failing to Clarify: The Courts Try to Define “Foreign Official” in 
FCPA Cases, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (May 23, 2011, 1:01 AM), 
http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/05/23/failing-to-clarify-the-courts-try-to-define-foreign-official-
in-fcpa-cases/. 
120. See, e.g., Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 10; United States v. 
Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009); United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-
MARTINEZ-BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010). 
121. No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009). 
122. Gov’t’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss, for a Bill of Particulars, 
and to Amend Schedule of Pretrial Submissions at 6, Nguyen (No. 08-522), ECF No. 109. 
123. Order at 1, Nguyen (No. 08-522). 
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subsequent case, United States v. Esquenazi,124 the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss garnered only a slightly more substantial analysis from the 
court.125 Esquenazi concerned a bribery scheme involving directors in 
Telecommunications D’Haiti (Haiti Téléco), Haiti’s ninety-seven 
percent state-owned telecommunications company.126 Rejecting the 
defendant’s “foreign official” challenge, the court stated, “The plain 
language of [the FCPA] and the plain meaning of [instrumentality] show 
that as the facts are alleged in the indictment Haiti Teleco could be an 
instrumentality of the Haitian government.”127 The court provided jury 
instructions with a list of non-exclusive factors to assess whether Haiti 
Téléco was an instrumentality of the Haitian government.128 
B.  Recent Cases on the “Foreign Official” Definition Have Provided 
a More Substantive Framework 
The California District Court in United States v. Aguilar129 addressed 
more substantively whether an SOE might qualify as an instrumentality 
within the meaning of the FCPA.130 In this case, the government charged 
the Lindsey Manufacturing Company, along with its president and chief 
financial officer, with paying bribes to two high-ranking employees of 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), an electric utility company 
owned by the Mexican government.131 The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that an SOE can never be an “instrumentality” of a 
foreign government because this would be contrary to the language and 
legislative intent of the statute.132 The ordinary meaning of the term 
                                                     
124. No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010). 
125. Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 1, Esquenazi (No. 09-
21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN). 
126. Indictment at 6, Esquenazi (No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN); see also Stunning 
Haiti Teleco Development, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
stunning-haiti-teleco-development (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
127. See Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to 
Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 3, Esquenazi (No. 
09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN). 
128. See Volkov, supra note 119. 
129. 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011), dismissed on other grounds, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 
(C.D. Cal. 2011). 
130. Id. at 4–16. 
131. Id. at 15.  
132. Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the First Superseding Indictment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3, Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (No. CR10-01031-
AHM) [hereinafter Aguilar Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss]. 
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“instrumentality” and the other provisions of the FCPA, according to 
defendants, clearly does not encompass state-owned business 
enterprises.133 Moreover, defendants argued, the legislative intent of the 
FCPA was to prevent the harmful consequences of bribes to government 
officials.134 Congress’s purpose was not to micro-manage U.S. business 
with every foreign company in which a government may have a 
monetary interest.135 The statute, therefore, singles out officials in 
government positions and does not encompass non-governmental 
employees of even majority state-owned companies.136 
The argument failed in April 2011, when Judge Matz denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss,137 noting that the FCPA’s statutory 
language is clear.138 The court held that “a state-owned corporation 
having the attributes of CFE may be an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign 
government within the meaning of the FCPA, and officers of such a 
state-owned corporation, as [the individuals who allegedly received 
bribes], may therefore be ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the 
FCPA.”139 Judge Matz articulated a non-exclusive list of characteristics 
shared by government agencies and departments that qualify as 
“instrumentalities”: 
 
 The entity provides a service to the citizens . . . of the 
jurisdiction. 
 The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are 
appointed by, government officials. 
 The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through 
governmental appropriations or through revenues 
obtained as a result of government-mandated taxes, 
licenses, fees or royalties . . . . 
 The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or 
controlling power to administer its designated functions. 
 The entity is widely perceived and understood to be 
performing official (i.e., governmental) functions.140 
 
                                                     
133. See id. at 12. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 18–19. 
136. See id. at 12. 
137. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
138. Id. at 1113. 
139. Id. at 1110. 
140. Id. at 1115. 
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Judge Matz reasoned that an “instrumentality” need not share “all of 
its characteristics with both a department and an agency,” lest the term 
be “robbed of independent meaning.”141 He then applied the listed 
factors to CFE, and noted that CFE performs a function that the Mexican 
Constitution acknowledges is solely a government function,142 “was 
created by statute as a ‘decentralized public entity,’” and has a 
“governing Board . . .  comprised of various high-ranking governmental 
officials.”143 Judge Matz also found very convincing the fact that it 
describes itself on its website as a governmental agency.144 
A subsequent case involving CFE adopted Judge Matz’s analysis in 
Aguilar. In United States v. O’Shea,145 the government charged a former 
general manager at a large robotics corporation, John Joseph O’Shea, 
with an 18-count indictment alleging he paid bribes to CFE in exchange 
for contracts for his company.146 O’Shea moved to dismiss using 
essentially the same argument as in Aguilar, that an SOE can never be an 
instrumentality of the state.147 Judge Lynn Hughes, in the Southern 
District of Texas, denied the motion.148 Judge Hughes did not issue a 
written ruling but took judicial notice of several facts about CFE: under 
Mexican law, electricity is a public service; CFE has a monopoly over it; 
the Mexican Ministry of Energy, Mines, and State-Owned Industry sets 
requirements for CFE; and the President of Mexico appoints the general 
director of CFE.149 The factors Judge Hughes noted generally matched 
the rubric laid out by Judge Matz, which indicates some consistency in 
the analytical framework courts have used to characterize a “foreign 
official.”150 
In another case involving a challenge to the “foreign official” 
                                                     
141. Id. at 1114. 
142. Id. at 1115–16; see also Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as 
amended, Art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federactión [DO], 5 de Enero de,1917 (Mex.). 
143. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (emphasis in original). 
144. Id. 
145. No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012). 
146. Indictment at 7–8, O’Shea (No. H-09-629). 
147. Defendant O’Shea’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Seventeen of the 
Indictment at 2, O’Shea (No. 09-629). 
148. Management Order at 1, O’Shea, (No. 09-629), ECF No. 107. 
149. See William McGrath, Judge Denies Motion to Dismiss Based on Definition of Foreign 
Official in O’Shea FCPA Case, FED. LAW SEC. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.fedseclaw.com/ 
2012/01/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1/judge-denies-motion-to-dismiss-based-on-
definition-of-foreign-official-in-oshea-fcpa-case/#axzz2KW9Wj2Ka. 
150. Compare id., with United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal 2011). 
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provision, United States v. Carson,151 Judge James Selna of the Central 
District of California, like Judges Matz and Hughes, emphasized the 
importance of the factual inquiry: “the question of whether state-owned 
companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA is a question of 
fact.”152 In this case, Stuart Carson, the Former Chief Executive Officer 
of Control Components, Inc. (CCI), was indicted along with five other 
defendants.153 The defendants moved to dismiss the first ten counts of 
the indictment with the familiar argument that an SOE cannot be an 
“instrumentality” as a matter of law.154 The court denied the motion to 
dismiss, stating that adopting the defendants’ construction would lead to 
an “impermissible narrowing of a statute intended to mount a broad 
attack on government corruption.”155 
Judge Selna employed a different framework from those used in 
Aguilar and O’Shea.156 The non-exclusive list of characteristics of 
government agencies that meet the description of an instrumentality 
include: 
 
 The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its 
employees; 
 The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity; 
 The purpose of the entity’s activities; 
 The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign 
state’s law, including whether the entity exercises 
exclusive or controlling power to administer its 
designated functions; 
 The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and 
 The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, 
including the level of financial support by the state (e.g., 
                                                     
151. No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011). 
152. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 3, 
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701. 
153. Indictment at 2–11, Carson (No. SACR 09–00077–JVS). 
154. Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 11. 
155. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 5, 
Carson, 2011 WL 501701. (The trial was scheduled for June 5, 2012, but before it occurred the 
defendants reached plea agreements.) For selected documents from the Carson docket, see FCPA 
and Related Enforcement Actions, United States v. Stuart Carson, et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/carsons.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
156. Compare Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the 
Indictment at 5, Carson, 2011 WL 501701, with United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 
1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).157 
 
The court emphasized that no single factor is dispositive.158 The list 
purports mainly to indicate what types of evidence are relevant when 
determining whether state-owned companies constitute an 
“instrumentality” under the FCPA.159 
These cases reveal an evolution in court guidance on the issue of what 
kind of entity may be classified as an “instrumentality” of government. 
All the cases emphasize that the analysis will depend on questions of 
fact, not law.160 Defendants, restricted to legal arguments by the format 
of a motion to dismiss, consistently advanced the same theory: that, 
under the FCPA, an SOE can never be an “instrumentality” as a matter 
of law.161 Yet each judge, in addressing the definition of an 
instrumentality, specifically rejected the defendants’ contention.162 None 
of the decisions suggested what level of state ownership would make an 
SOE an “instrumentality” under the FCPA. Businesses attempting to 
develop compliance programs may become frustrated by the fact that 
courts have declined to produce a bright-line rule regarding what makes 
an entity an “instrumentality.”163 
C.  The Department of Justice Defines “Instrumentality” Broadly and 
States That It Can Include State-Owned or State-Controlled 
Entities 
The Department asserts that it provides sufficient guidance with 
                                                     
157. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 3–
4, Carson, 2011 WL 501701. 
158. Id. at 5. The court also rejected the defendants’ void-for-vagueness challenge, stating that 
the Government’s “substantial evidentiary burden to establish that a business entity constitutes a 
government instrumentality . . . does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 
11. The court rejected the defendants’ argument for applying the rule of lenity. Id. at 10.  
159. Id. 
   160. See id. at 6; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
   161. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment 
at 6, Carson, 2011 WL 501701; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Order Denying Defendant Joel 
Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal 
Offense and for Vagueness at 3, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-
BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010); Order at 1, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
2, 2009). 
162. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment 
at 6, Carson, 2011 WL 501701; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Order Denying Defendant Joel 
Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal 
Offense and for Vagueness at 3, Esquenazi (No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN); Order at 1, 
Nguyen (No. 08-522). 
163. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 574; Cohen, supra note 28, at 1272. 
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respect to FCPA enforcement to notify companies how to comply.164 At 
a recent Senate hearing, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Greg 
Andres confirmed the DOJ’s position that the Department provides 
sufficient guidance with respect to FCPA enforcement.165 Mr. Andres 
listed several sources of information, including the DOJ’s Lay Person’s 
Guide to the FCPA166 and the FCPA Opinion Procedure.167 The Lay 
Person’s Guide to the FCPA conspicuously fails to define 
“instrumentality.”168 In November 2012, the DOJ and the SEC published 
a guidance document on the FCPA, in which they specifically addressed 
the definition of an “instrumentality.”169 The report asserts that whether 
a particular entity constitutes an “instrumentality” requires a “fact-
specific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, status, and 
function.”170 Furthermore, the report explains that in some circumstances 
an entity may qualify as an instrumentality absent fifty percent or greater 
foreign government ownership.171 Finally, the report refers to the list of 
factors to consider that several courts had provided.172 
                                                     
164. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement 
of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); CRIMINAL DIV. OF U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO 
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 20 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121114101438198031.pdf. 
165. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement 
of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7, 62 (2011) 
(statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
166. See FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3. 
167. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement 
of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 2(f) (2006). This 
procedure allows companies to request determination by the Attorney General as to whether its 
proposed conduct would violate FCPA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 2(f). 
168. See Huggard & Morrison, supra note 28, at 1. 
169. See A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, supra note 6, at 
20. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 21. 
172. Id. at 20 (The factors listed are: “the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity; the 
foreign state’s degree of control over the entity (including whether key officers and directors of the 
entity are, or are appointed by, government officials); the foreign state’s characterization of the 
entity and its employees; the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; the purpose of the 
entity’s activities; the entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law; the exclusive 
or controlling power vested in the entity to administer its designated functions; the level of financial 
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In Carson, the DOJ supported its position with principles of statutory 
construction, arguing that the statute is unambiguous because 
“instrumentality” is a commonly used legal term173 and has an accepted 
legal definition that would incorporate an instrumentality.174 This 
position has succeeded in several cases, with courts agreeing that the 
term is clear.175 The DOJ also argued in Carson that interpreting the 
statute in context is necessary to ensure that all the provisions of the 
statute have meaning.176 According to a principle of statutory 
interpretation, courts should not interpret a statute in such a way that 
portions of the statute have no effect.177 For example, the DOJ argues 
that the provision defining “routine governmental action” as “providing 
phone service, power and water supply” would be rendered meaningless 
if the definition of “instrumentality” necessarily excluded SOEs.178 
SOEs typically are included in the governmental entities that provide 
these services.179 
In Carson, the defendant contended that the DOJ opinions have no 
binding application to parties other than those requesting the opinion and 
“will not affect the requesting issuer’s . . . obligations to any other 
agency,” such as the SEC.180 Furthermore, of the five opinions that have 
dealt with the definition of “foreign official,” only one analyzes the facts 
                                                     
support by the foreign state (including subsidies, special tax treatment, government-mandated fees, 
and loans); the entity’s provision of services to the jurisdiction’s residents; whether the 
governmental end or purpose sought to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the foreign 
government; and the general perception that the entity is performing official or governmental 
functions.”) 
173. The United States Code, for example, uses the word “instrumentality” in 1478 separate 
provisions.  
174. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts One through 
Ten of the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 16, United States v. Carson, No. 
SACR 09–00077–JVS (C.D. Cal. filed April 18, 2011), ECF No. 332 [hereinafter Gov’t’s 
Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss] (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 
2009) (defining instrumentality as “[a] thing used to achieve an end or purpose”)). 
175. See, e.g., Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to 
Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 3, United States v. 
Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-MARTINEZ-BROWN (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010); Transcript of 
Pretrial Motions Hearing at 108, United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“I think that the language itself, and the very definition of instrumentality that you proposed in your 
briefs, makes it unnecessary to even engage in a legislative history or statutory analysis . . . .”) 
176. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 20. 
177. See id. (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1978) (“explaining that ‘[in] 
construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used’”)).  
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(iv) (2006). 
179. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 21–22. 
180. 28 C.F.R. § 80.11. 
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provided by the company requesting the opinion.181 One scholar has 
argued that DOJ opinions are therefore not functionally equivalent to the 
binding precedent produced by judicial review.182 The defendant in 
Carson also argued that, following the principle noscitur a sociis (a 
word draws meaning from the terms around it), “instrumentality” should 
be considered in context of the two terms preceding it in the statute, 
“department” and “agency.”183 Following this principle, then an 
“instrumentality” cannot be an entity in which the government has 
merely a monetary investment, because such a construction would give 
the word a different meaning than the others that precede it.184 
The FCPA’s definition of “routine governmental action” in the grease 
payments exception further supports defendants’ position.185 The FCPA 
defines “routine governmental action” to include power and water 
supply.186 The exception applies only to governmental action, which 
could suggest that SOEs are not included in “instrumentalities” because 
they are not exclusively government-owned.187 This last argument is 
weakened by the fact that some of these functions are typically carried 
out by commercial (e.g. not necessarily governmental) entities, lending 
support to the conclusion that an instrumentality does not have to be 
purely governmental.188 
                                                     
181. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 12-01 
(Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 10-03 (Sept. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1003.pdf; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 94-01 (May 13, 1994), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1994/9401.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 86-01 (Jul. 18, 1986), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1986/r8601.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 82-02 (Feb. 18, 1982, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1982/r8202.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, No. 80-01 (Oct. 29, 1980), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/1980/r8001.pdf. 
182. Cohen, supra note 28, at 1251. 
183. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 12. 
184. Id. (“[T]he government’s proposed reading of ‘instrumentality’ as encompassing any entity 
in which a government has a monetary investment makes that term fundamentally different from the 
first three since a business enterprise . . . cannot fairly be said to be carrying out governmental 
(rather than commercial) functions . . . .”). 
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2006); see also supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(iv). 
187. Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 18. 
188. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 22 
(arguing that the “routine governmental action” exception demonstrates that there are functions, like 
delivery of power, that can be both governmental and commercial). 
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Anti-corruption legislation in foreign jurisdictions, while also not 
binding, sheds some light on how corporate concepts of control have 
been used to identify an SOE to which bribery statutes apply. 
IV.  THE OECD CONVENTION AND THE UK ANTI-BRIBERY 
ACT TAKE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEFINING A 
FOREIGN OFFICIAL THAN DOES THE FCPA 
The heightened international focus on combating corruption has 
caused various countries to introduce several anti-corruption statutes.189 
This section examines two prominent examples of international anti-
corruption legislation: the OECD Convention190 and the UK Bribery Act 
of 2010.191 The former can be used as a tool for interpreting the FCPA 
because it binds the United States to conform its anti-bribery legislation 
to the requirements outlined in the OECD Convention.192 The United 
States advocated for the creation of the OECD Convention to “level the 
playing field” for United States businesses that faced a comparative 
disadvantage competing against businesses not subject to anti-bribery 
legislation.193 Congress amended the FCPA in 1998 to implement and 
ensure conformance with the OECD Convention.194 Each of the thirty-
nine signatories195 to the OECD Convention has an anti-corruption 
framework because of the OECD’s requirement that countries create or 
amend existing anti-corruption laws in order to comply with the OECD 
Convention.196 
                                                     
189. See, e.g., Lucinda A. Low & Owen J. Bonheimer, Enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Extraterritorial Reach and the Effects of International Standards 12 (presented to the 
Int’l Bar Ass’n Annual Conference Anti-Corruption Working Grp. in Chi., Ill. on Sept. 19, 2006). 
190. OECD Convention, supra note 42. 
191. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). 
192. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. I (“Each Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, 
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, 
to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain 
from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.”). 
193. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998). 
194. See OECD Convention, supra note 42; S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998). 
195. See OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 2012 
(Nov. 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ 
antibriberyconventionratification.pdf. 
196. See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 4.4 (directing each signatory country to 
“take remedial steps”). Additionally, many countries that have not ratified the OECD Convention 
have either signed other treaties or introduced their own anti-corruption legislation. See Low & 
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The UK Bribery Act is included as a comparison to the FCPA. The 
UK Bribery Act is more expansive than both the FCPA and the OECD 
Convention, protecting all forms of bribery (governmental and 
commercial).197 Although the UK Bribery Act does not influence the 
FCPA,198 it demonstrates how another country has approached 
preventing bribery of various entities. 
A.  The OECD Convention Defines “Foreign Official” by Focusing on 
Function and Conduct 
First, the OECD Convention uses familiar legal principles of 
“control” to define a public enterprise.199 Second, it only prohibits 
payments to entities that are majority owned by the government.200 
Initially, thirty-three countries signed the OECD Convention on 
December 17, 1998.201 The United States urged the development of the 
                                                     
Bonheimer , supra note 189, at 13–21 (discussing international anti-corruption conventions); 
Snapshot of the China Country Profile, BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/china/snapshot/ 
(discussing the anti-corruption legislation China has enacted). 
197. See U.S. FCPA vs. UK Bribery Act, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (last visited Feb. 14 2013), 
http://www.transparency-usa.org/documents/FCPAvsBriberyAct.pdf (providing a chart comparing 
the FCPA with the UK Anti-Bribery Act); see also Ron Reid, A Comparison Between the UK 
Bribery Act and the FCPA, SHOOSMITHS (May 9, 2012), http://www.shoosmiths.co.uk/client-
resources/legal-updates/A-comparison-between-UK-Bribery-Act-and-the-FCPA-1543.aspx (“The 
UK Bribery Act is wider in scope than the US Foreign & Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in a number 
of respects.”); FCPA and UK Bribery Act 2010 Offenses Comparison Chart, CHADBOURNE PARKE 
LLP (June 2011), 
http://www.ukbriberyact2010.com/Assets/Resources/FCPA_BriberyActComparison_WEB.pdf.; A 
Client Alert From Paul Hastings by Michelle Duncan et al., A Comparison of the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1750.pdf. 
198. The UK Bribery Act is a law enacted only in the UK. No convention requires that the U.S. 
reproduce the Bribery Act. The only connection between the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act is the 
fact that both were enacted because the two countries are signatories to the OECD and thus obliged 
to enact anti-bribery legislation in conformation with the OECD Convention. See OECD 
Convention, supra note 42, at art. 4.4 (directing each signatory country to enact anti-bribery 
legislation). The U.S. already conforms to the OECD, and thus it is not required to go beyond what 
the OECD requires. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (amending the FCPA to conform to the OECD 
Convention). 
199. ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME PRACTITIONERS 57 (2d ed. 2012). 
200. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Negotiating Conference, 
Commentaries on the Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 14 (adopted Nov. 21, 1997), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/38028044.pdf.  
201. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. I; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text.  
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OECD Convention in the hope that the Convention would reduce the 
competitive disadvantage U.S. businesses faced compared to their 
foreign counterparts not subject to anti-bribery laws.202 
The definition of a “foreign public official” in the OECD Convention 
focuses on the individual’s function and conduct.203 The OECD 
Convention defines a “foreign public official” as “any person holding a 
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country . . . any 
person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a 
public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public 
international organisation [sic].”204 The term most closely analogous to 
the FCPA’s instrumentality is a “public enterprise.”205 The OECD 
Convention defines a “public enterprise” as: 
[A]ny enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a 
government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly, 
exercise a dominant influence. This is deemed to be the case, 
inter alia, when the government or governments hold the 
majority of the enterprise’s subscribed capital, control the 
majority of votes attaching to shares issued by the enterprise or 
can appoint a majority of the members of the enterprise’s 
administrative or managerial body or supervisory board.206 
An official of a “public enterprise” is deemed to perform a public 
function unless “the enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in 
the relevant market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent to 
that of a private enterprise.”207 An SOE, therefore, is either a public or a 
private enterprise under the OECD’s definition, depending on its 
function.208 A public-enterprise SOE might be largely owned or 
substantially subsidized by the government. By contrast, a private-
enterprise SOE benefits from some government investment, but 
competes on an equal footing in the marketplace with other private 
companies not subsidized by the government. Unlike the FCPA, the 
OECD Convention explicitly includes SOEs in its “foreign public 
official” provision.209 Crucially, the definition also focuses on the level 
                                                     
202. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998). 
203. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1260.  
204. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1 ¶ 4(a); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).  
205. 2010 OECD REPORT PHASE 3, supra note 32, at 32. 
206. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Negotiating Conference, supra 
note 200, at 15. 
207. Id. 
208. See TARUN, supra note 199, at 57.  
209. See id. 
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of control the government holds over an enterprise to determine whether 
it is a “public enterprise.”210 
The fact that Congress did not include this term has sparked debate: 
did Congress believe “public enterprises” were already encompassed by 
“instrumentalities,” or did Congress not intend to prohibit bribes made to 
SOEs?211 The legislative history of the 1998 Amendments supports both 
propositions.212 Anna Harkin, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the 
DOJ, sent the Speaker of the House (Newt Gingrich) and the President 
of the Senate (Al Gore) a draft bill with the proposed amendments to the 
FCPA on May 4, 1998.213 These “Transmittal Letters” explained that the 
proposed legislation, among other things, purported to expand “the 
FCPA definition of public official to include officials of [public 
international] organizations.”214 On July 30, 1998, Senator Alfonse 
D’Amato introduced these suggestions in S. 2375, an Act titled “The 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.”215 S. 
2375 passed the Senate on July 31, 1998.216 In the House, the bill was 
introduced as H.R. 4353 on July 30, 1998, and was passed October 9, 
1998.217 President Clinton ultimately signed S. 2375 on November 10, 
1998.218 Neither the House nor the Senate bills expressly incorporated 
“public enterprises” into the definition of “foreign official.”219 
In Carson, defendants support their argument that the post-1998 
FCPA does not cover SOEs by pointing to the fact that Congress 
borrowed some components of the OECD to augment the FCPA but did 
not make a wholesale revision.220 Professor Koehler, who compiled the 
portions of the legislative history relevant to the “foreign official” 
                                                     
210. Id. 
211. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 29–31; 
Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 29. 
212. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1255–56. 
213. See Transmittal Letters, Letter from Anne Harkin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Dep’t 
of Justice, to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House (May 4, 1998) (on file with author). 
214. See id. 
215. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, S. 2375, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (as passed on July 31, 1998). 
216. Id. 
217. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, H.R. 4353, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (as passed on Oct. 9, 1998). 
218. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1). 
219. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 29. 
220. See id. at 27–29. 
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definition,221 explains that members of Congress were informed that the 
1998 Amendments would not make the FCPA and the OECD 
Convention identical.222 If this is the case, Defendants contend that the 
portions of the OECD Convention that differ from the FCPA were only 
adopted if Congress explicitly added them.223 Conversely, the 
government in Carson has claimed that Congress’s decision to not adopt 
provisions of the OECD Convention that differed slightly from the 
FCPA may show that Congress believed these provisions were already 
included.224 Unlike the legislative history of the 1998 Amendments and 
the language of the FCPA itself, the OECD Convention’s definition of 
“public official” contains some concrete ways to measure government 
control.225 
B.  The U.K. Anti-Bribery Act Provides a More Robust Prohibition on 
Foreign Bribery than the OECD Convention 
The United Kingdom Anti-Bribery Act of 2010226 (U.K. Bribery Act) 
has been referred to as “the FCPA on steroids”227 because it has a broad 
jurisdictional reach, prohibits bribes made to both private and public 
individuals, and identifies “failure to prevent bribery”228 as a distinct 
offense.229 The U.K. Bribery Act creates four separate offenses: 1) 
bribing,230 2) being bribed,231 3) bribing a foreign public official,232 and 
                                                     
221. Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at ¶ 395. 
222. Id. 
223. Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 28–29. 
224.  See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 29–
30. (“[O]nly one unrelated amendment to the FCPA was necessary in Congress’s view to bring the 
statute into compliance with the OECD Convention. Otherwise, Congress considered the FCPA’s 
definition of ‘foreign official’ to be inclusive of the definition in the OECD Convention.”).  
   225. OECD Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1 ¶ 4(a). 
226. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). 
227. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Introducing the New “FCPA on Steroids,” WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(Dec. 28, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/28/introducing-the-new-fcpa-on-
steroids/. 
228. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.); see also LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, LITIGATION 
DEPARTMENT, UK BRIBERY ACT 2010—AN EXTENDED TIMETABLE FOR GUIDANCE AND 
COMMENCEMENT (July 22, 2010) (analyzing the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act’s jurisdiction). 
229. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.); Marcus Sohlberg, The United Kingdom Bribery Act 
2010–Anti-Corruption Legislation with a Significant Jurisdictional Reach, THE L. LIBR. CONGRESS 
(Mar. 2011), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-bribery-act.php. 
230. Bribery Act, 2010 c. 23, § 1 (U.K.). 
231. Id. §§ 2, 3(2). 
232. Id. § 6. 
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4) failing as a commercial organization to prevent bribery.233 The section 
most similar to the FCPA’s “foreign official”234 provision defines a 
“foreign public official” as including: 
An individual who—(a) holds a legislative, administrative or 
judicial position of any kind . . . (b) exercises a public 
function— (i) for or on behalf of a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom . . . or (ii) for any public agency or public 
enterprise of that country or territory . . . or (c) is an official or 
agent of a public international organization [sic].235 
Subsection (b) on individuals who exercise a public function for any 
public agency or public enterprise is analogous to the FCPA’s 
“instrumentality” language and concept.236 
On March 30, 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice clarified how the 
U.K. Bribery Act will operate.237 The policy behind the foreign public 
official offense is “the need to prohibit the influencing of decision 
making in the context of publicly funded business opportunities.”238 
However, the expressed policy offers little clarification as to what types 
of SOEs could be covered because it fails to define “public function.”239 
The U.K. Bribery Act’s “foreign official” provision closely mirrors the 
FCPA definition.240 However, this dilemma may not have been a major 
concern for the U.K. Bribery Act’s drafters because the U.K. legislation, 
unlike the FCPA, also explicitly criminalizes commercial bribery.241 
Case law emanating from the year-old U.K. Bribery Act remains in its 
infancy, and thus has not yet produced any clarifications that might 
assist U.S. courts.242 
                                                     
233. Id. § 7; see also F. Joseph Warin, et al., The British are Coming!: Britain Changes its Law 
on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 8 
(2010). 
234. See Warin et al., supra note 233, at 8 (describing the foreign public official offense as 
“directly analogous” to the FCPA).  
235. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(5) (U.K.). 
236. See id.; TARUN, supra note 199, at 430. 
237. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY 
ACT 2010) 2 (2011). 
238. Id. at 11. 
239. Id.; see also Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(5)(b)(i) (U.K.). 
240. See Warin et al., supra note 233, at 18. 
241. Warin et al., supra note 233, at 18–19. 
242. See The U.K. Bribery Act: One Year Later, Enforcement and Its Implications for Companies, 
ALIXPARTNERS LLP, 2 (2012) (noting “[t]o date, not a single successful prosecution has been 
brought against a company by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which is responsible for 
enforcing the law”); Sohlberg, supra note 229. 
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V.  U.S. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE CORPORATE CONCEPT 
OF CONTROL TO THE FCPA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE 
NEEDED CLARITY TO U.S. BUSINESSES 
Theories of statutory construction, the legislative history relevant to 
the definition of a “foreign official,” and recent court opinions have all 
failed to clearly identify the types of entities included within 
“instrumentality.” The defendants in FCPA cases argue that neither the 
principles of statutory interpretation nor the legislative history fully 
clarifies whether an “instrumentality” includes an SOE.243 Because of 
the ambiguity in the text and legislative history, courts use an evolving 
list of factors relating to the functions performed by the SOE and its 
connections to the government.244 These multifactor tests, however, 
overcomplicate the issue. Both sides of the debate have agreed that the 
statute intends to prevent the detrimental effects of bribery on foreign 
governments.245 Therefore, determining the connection the entity has to 
the government would inform the extent to which bribery of officials 
within that entity would affect the government. 
This Comment proposes using the concept of “control” derived from 
U.S. corporate law to determine whether an SOE is within the definition 
of an instrumentality. The test for “control” is used within corporate law 
to determine whether certain shareholders exert sufficient influence that 
they have additional fiduciary duties to the organization and non-
                                                     
243. Both sides of the debate have argued that the legislative history supports their interpretation. 
Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 Through 10 of the Indictment at 3, United 
States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011). The 
defendants typically support their narrow reading of the “foreign official” provision with four 
principal observations drawn from the legislative history. First, the legislative history contains no 
explicit reference to the inclusion of an SOE in the definition. Second, Congress enacted the FCPA 
to prevent the “severe foreign policy problems” stemming from bribes to high-ranking government 
officials. Third, Congress declined the opportunity explicitly include SOEs in the definition when it 
amended the FCPA to conform to the OECD Convention. Fourth, Congress considered including 
SOEs in earlier versions of the FCPA, but ultimately omitted them from the version that was 
enacted. Defendants in FCPA enforcement actions have claimed that Congress’s decision to discard 
the versions that specifically referenced SOEs evinces an intention to not include SOEs within the 
definition of a “foreign official.” See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 21–
29. The government contends that a prominent weakness in this argument is that the bill ultimately 
enacted did not specifically reject the components of the enumerated list that other bills contained. 
Here, Congress adopted a general term that could theoretically include SOEs but, in doing so, did 
not mention eliminating SOEs from the definition. See Gov’t’s Opposition to Carson Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 37–38. 
244. See, e.g., supra notes 136–158 and accompanying text. 
245. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 22; Gov’t’s Opposition to 
Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 1. 
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controlling shareholders.246 To determine whether a shareholder owes 
these duties, U.S. courts have developed numerous methods for 
ascertaining actual control.247 Adopting these tests in the context of the 
FCPA would be beneficial because corporations subject to the FCPA are 
already familiar with this concept. A significant body of case law 
already exists to clarify the various situations in advance. The use of this 
test would help eliminate the inevitable complications that arise as courts 
develop a new framework for assessing the connections between SOEs 
and governments. 
A.  The Principles of “Control” in U.S. Corporate Law Consist of a 
Defined Body of Law that Measures Corporate Responsibility 
U.S. corporate law has long used principles of “control” to assess 
fiduciary duties,248 ownership, or liability for wrongdoing.249 U.S. 
corporate law does not provide a bright-line rule for determining the 
level of control held over a corporation, but the guidelines courts use are 
ones that businesses are accustomed to applying.250 The most dominant 
source of U.S. Corporate law is Delaware, where over half of the 
corporations listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange are 
incorporated.251 Delaware law measures control in two different ways: 
(1) percent of ownership252 and (2) actual control.253 When a shareholder 
                                                     
246. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Ivanhoe Partners v. 
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument 
Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1987). 
247. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 72 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that voting rights, 
majority—or effective majority—ownership, and participation in management activities all signify 
“control” in the corporate sense).  
248. For example, courts have used principles of “control” to determine fiduciary duties owed by 
controlling shareholders. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114.  
249. See, e.g., Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assoc. v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 
1075, 1086 (Ohio 2008) (discussing the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and noting that 
control of the corporation is so complete as to amount to total domination of finances, policy, and 
business practices such that the controlled corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence); see 
also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 247, at 72–75, 90. 
250. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 247, at 267 (“Any bright-line rule inevitably will be set 
arbitrarily and therefore prove simultaneously over-and under-inclusive.”). 
251. See id. (noting Delaware is “far and away the dominant source of state corporation law”). 
252. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). But see Odyssey 
Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 407–08 (Del. 1999) (holding that an owner of 50.1% 
of the stock did not dominate or control the board.) 
253. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1344 (“Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary 
duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the 
corporation.”) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)); see also 
In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d. 319, 328 (Del. 1993). 
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or group of shareholders has the ability to control the corporate decision-
making, despite owning less than fifty percent of the outstanding voting 
shares, the shareholder is deemed to have (actual) control.254 For 
example, in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems Inc., the court 
determined that Alcatel was a controlling shareholder even though it 
owned only 43.3% of the outstanding stock.255 The court noted a 
“shareholder who owns less than fifty percent of a corporation’s 
outstanding stocks does not, without more, become a controlling 
shareholder of that corporation.”256 However, in relation to Alcatel, the 
court determined it exercised control by designating five of its eleven 
directors and coercing Lynch to permit it to purchase a sufficient 
quantity of stock to become the controlling shareholder, at much lower 
than the negotiated price.257 
Under Delaware law, the significance of deeming a shareholder 
controlling is that it owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and to non-
controlling shareholders.258 Courts evaluate transactions involving 
controlling shareholders for “entire fairness,” 259 which is a process-
oriented standard examining whether the transaction involved “fair 
dealing” and a “fair price.”260 This commonly used test for determining 
the level of control exerted over the corporation should be transferred to 
standardize the approach in determining whether an SOE is an 
instrumentality. 
                                                     
254. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994) (noting that “[f]or 
a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must 
allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control of corporation conduct”) (citing 
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)). 
255. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114. 
256. Id. (citing Citron, 569 A.2d at 70).  
257. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1112, 1120 (“[T]he coercion was extant and directed to a specific 
price offer which was, in effect, presented in the form of a ‘take it or leave it’ ultimatum by a 
controlling shareholder with the capability of following through on its threat of a hostile takeover.”).  
258. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113–14; Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061 n.83 (Del. 
2004).  
259. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115–17. 
260. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness has 
two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces questions of when the 
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and 
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness 
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant 
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the 
intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.”). 
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B.  Courts Should Adopt the “Control” Test to Standardize the 
Approach to Determining if an SOE Is an “Instrumentality” 
Applying the principles of corporate law to determine control would 
be advantageous to courts and businesses because of the familiarity of 
the applicable tests. Even if the courts decline to adopt a bright-line rule 
for determining control based on percentage of ownership, corporate law 
has developed numerous methods for ascertaining actual control.261 This 
approach to assessing control of an organization, besides being familiar 
to both corporations and courts, is also consistent with the method the 
OECD uses to define “public enterprise.”262 This continuity would 
further clarify an area of law whose imprecise and divergent legal 
standards have produced the current confused state of the law—a 
confusion that might have an adverse effect on U.S. businesses. 
A judicial opinion would likely be the most efficient route to further 
clarity for businesses. Alternatives to guidance from the courts would be 
the DOJ’s adoption of prosecutorial guidelines or amendment of the 
FCPA. Unlike the DOJ advisory opinions, a court’s opinion would 
provide precedential value. Even at the district court level, while not 
binding, opinions are still persuasive to other courts. The DOJ posits that 
the statute is clear; therefore, it seems unlikely to take the initiative to 
add further guidance.263A legislative amendment would likely take years 
to draft, debate and pass. 
Lacking a clear rubric for determining what falls within the definition 
of a “foreign official,” well-intentioned businesses are hesitant to engage 
in business abroad when they do not know how to structure their FCPA 
compliance programs.264 Clear guidelines will provide a framework for 
businesses developing their compliance programs and allow those that 
wish to adhere to the FCPA to do so. The current enforcement practices, 
while lucrative for the DOJ and SEC, seem to have strayed from the 
primary rationale behind the enactment of the FCPA.265 This Comment 
                                                     
261. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 247, at 72 (noting that voting rights, majority (or effective 
majority) ownership, and participation in management activities all signify “control” in the 
corporate sense).  
262. See supra notes 199–224 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of a “public 
enterprise” focuses on the level of control the government holds over an enterprise.). 
263. See Huggard & Morrison, supra note 28. 
264. See Carson Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84; see also MICHAEL V. 
SEITZINGER, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (Mar. 3, 1999), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/Crsfcpa.htm. 
265. See Bixby, supra note 13, at 92–94; supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text, summarizing 
sources explaining that Congress’s rationale was to prevent U.S. businesses from engaging in 
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argues that the most effective way to give sufficient notice to businesses 
and still permit prosecution of bribery of SOEs would be for courts to 
apply corporate law principles of control to determine what types of 
bribery are prohibited under the FCPA. 
The DOJ has previously acknowledged that the degree of control a 
foreign government exercises over an enterprise informs the DOJ’s 
determination of whether the entity is an “instrumentality” under the 
FCPA.266 Applying corporate law principles for determining whether a 
shareholder is a “controlling shareholder” would be useful in gauging 
the level of control the government has over an SOE, thus explaining 
whether it conforms to the definition of an “instrumentality.” This area 
of law is particularly well-developed (as compared to the FCPA), and 
further, this is an area that corporations can be expected to understand. 
Applying these principles to the FCPA, the courts would consider the 
level of control a government has over an SOE to reflect how closely the 
two are linked. This, in turn, would help courts determine whether 
bribing an official within that entity would result in the deleterious 
consequences that the FCPA was enacted to prevent. 
CONCLUSION 
The increase in FCPA enforcement actions and the severity of 
sanctions has forced companies to reconsider their approach to business 
abroad.267 Businesses have resorted to cautious behavior to minimize 
their risk of prosecution for violating the FCPA.268 Prosecution can 
result in expensive litigation, reputational harm, or high settlement fees. 
                                                     
bribery, as this led to serious foreign policy problems and damaged the image of the United States 
abroad. 
266. U.S. RESPONSE TO OECD PHASE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 36. 
267. See Witten et al., supra note 11, at 3. 
268. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS – SHOULD ANYTHING BE 
DONE TO MINIMIZE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.’S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATTING OFFSHORE 
CORRUPTION? 7, 11 (Dec. 2011) (noting that the FCPA’s unclear scope and broad interpretation of 
the provisions advocated by the DOJ and SEC “may render corporations and individual officers 
overly cautious, avoiding not only objectionable conduct but also acts that should be permitted and 
even encouraged”); Dickstein Shapiro LLP Alert by David M. Nadler et al., DOJ and SEC Issue 
Foreign Corrupt Practice Guidance (Nov. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.dicksteinshapiro.com/resources/alerts/detail.aspx?publication=2233 (“[T]he long-
awaited FCPA guidance is a comprehensive and useful restatement of the government’s positions 
with respect to the statute, but fails to provide the type of ‘bright line’ rules regarding FCPA 
compliance that many practitioners and commentators had hoped for . . . . Companies doing 
business in foreign countries must continue to exercise caution, and to obtain expert professional 
advice, to minimize their risk of liability under the FCPA.”). 
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At the same time, the conservative approach adopted by American 
businesses has put them at a disadvantage compared to other 
corporations not constrained by the FCPA. 
The courts should resolve these issues by refining the definition of 
“instrumentality” using principles of corporate law regarding “control.” 
This direction remains the most viable option given the limited direction 
from the courts thus far in defining “instrumentality.” The FCPA, 
though not new, does not have a well-established line of precedent that 
answers the question. Strict reliance on the legislative history to 
understand the meaning of “instrumentality” has been inconclusive.269 
Reasonable arguments support both sides of the debate as to whether the 
“foreign official” provision incorporates SOEs.270 An amendment to the 
FCPA that clearly defines “foreign official” would be ideal, but is 
unlikely to occur any time soon. 
Applying corporate law principles of control would help determine 
the extent to which the person or entity was a part of the foreign 
country’s government. If the courts provided such guidance, businesses 
could determine whether an SOE falls under the definition of an 
“instrumentality” based on how much control the government retains. 
This would provide a clear means of identifying the SOEs whose 
employees could influence the government and therefore impact the 
public interest if bribed. This approach would achieve Congress’s 
objectives in enacting the FCPA to prevent corruption of foreign public 
officials and the negative consequences for foreign policy.271 Until such 
guidance is formulated, businesses developing their compliance 
programs must resort to overly cautious behavior or risk prosecution for 
violating the FCPA. 
                                                     
269. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
270. See United States v. O’Shea, No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011); Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 
2d 1108. 
271. See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text. 
